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Should We Presume State Protection?
James C. Hathaway and Audrey Macklin

M

Abstract

ore than two decades later, the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Ward v Canada, [1993] 2 SCR
689 remains one of the world’s most significant
refugee law decisions. Ward’s holdings on such matters as
the meaning of both “membership of a particular social
group” and the relevance of non-state agents of persecution were groundbreaking and of indisputable value to the
evolution of refugee protection in Canada and around the
world. Indeed, Ward made clear the overarching purpose of
refugee law, which informs nearly every interpretive question: “International refugee law was formulated to serve as
a back-up to protection one expects from the state of which
an individual is a national. It was meant to come in to play
only in situations when that protection is unavailable, and
then only in certain situations. The international community intended that persecuted individuals be required to
approach their home state for protection before the responsibility of other states becomes engaged.”
More controversially, however, the Court addressed the
question of how best to operationalize the surrogate protection principle. While in Ward the home country had conceded its inability to protect, the Court nonetheless opined
about how to proceed in the more usual case where there is
no such concession: “Clear and convincing confirmation of
a state’s inability to protect must be provided. For example,
a claimant might advance testimony of similarly situated
individuals let down by the state protection arrangement or
the claimant’s testimony of past personal incidents in which
state protection did not materialize. Absent some evidence,
the claim should fail, as nations should be presumed capable
of protecting their citizens. Security of nationals is, after all,
the essence of sovereignty. Absent a situation of complete
breakdown of state apparatus …, it should be assumed that
the state is capable of protecting a claimant” (emphasis added).
While clearly obiter dicta, this passage has generated real
controversy. First, courts have struggled with the question
of whether the adequacy of state protection focuses on the

Professors Hathaway and Macklin debate the legality of the
“presumption of state protection” that the Supreme Court of
Canada established as a matter of Canadian refugee law
in the Ward decision. Professor Hathaway argues that this
presumption should be rejected because it lacks a sound
empirical basis and because it conflicts with the relatively
low evidentiary threshold set by the Refugee Convention’s
“well-founded fear” standard. Professor Macklin contends
that the Ward presumption does not in and of itself impose
an unduly onerous burden on claimants, and that much
of the damage wrought by the presumption comes instead
from misinterpretation and misapplication of the Supreme
Court’s dictum by lower courts.

Résumé

Les professeurs Hathaway et Macklin reconsidèrent la
légalité de la « présomption de la protection de l’État »
que La Cour suprême du Canada avait promulgé comme
principe de droit canadien en matière de réfugiés dans
le jugement Ward. Le professeur Hathaway soutient que
cette présomption devrait être rejetée en raison de son
manque de fondement empirique rigoureux ainsi que
de son incompatibilité avec le niveau de preuve relativement faible impliqué par la norme de « crainte justifiée »
établie par la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés.
La professeure Macklin estime que la présomption Ward
n’impose guère en soi un fardeau excessivement lourd sur
les demandeurs, et que la plupart des problèmes engendrés
par la présomption découlent des erreurs d’interprétation
ou d’application de la décision de la Cour suprême de la
part des tribunaux inférieurs.
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2. But more importantly, I think that we do presume
that states are able and willing to protect their citizens
(which they do by refraining from persecuting them
and by protecting them from abuses by others). That
presumption explains why the burden is on a refugee
claimant to make out (on a standard of reasonable
chance/serious risk) the elements of his/her claim
(well-founded fear of persecution on enumerated
grounds). It is true that the court didn’t have to say
anything about it and I am persuaded by your critique
(not to mention subsequent Federal Court jurisprudence) that it definitely would have been better not to
have said anything. Read in its best light, however, the
Supreme Court in Ward is saying no more than “It is
the job of a state to protect its citizens. It’s up to you,
refugee claimant, to prove that your state won’t do its
job with respect to you.” I think that the mistake in
the Federal Court jurisprudence is to double up on
that burden by adding a separate (and tougher) burden specific to failure of state protection qua discrete
element in the refugee analysis.

efforts made by the state to protect, or on whether state
action is effective in reducing the risk of persecution below
the threshold of “reasonable chance.” Second and more generally, the basic notion of a “presumption” of state protection has led lower courts to impose a significant burden on
persons seeking recognition of refugee status. For example,
the Federal Court of Appeal in Carrillo v Canada, 2008 FCA
94, at [30], interpreted Ward as imposing on refugee claimants a burden to “adduce relevant, reliable and convincing
evidence which satisfies the trier of fact on the balance of
probabilities that the state protection is inadequate.”
In The Law of Refugee Status1 James Hathaway and
Michelle Foster argue that the notion that states are “presumed to protect” their citizens, as suggested in Canada v
Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, is unsound. In their view the resultant duty on refugee claimants to rebut a presumption of state
protection is at odds with the duty of the applicant to show no
more than a “well-founded fear” of being persecuted. More
generally, Hathaway and Foster endorse the view of the Full
Federal Court of Australia in A. v Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs, (1993) 53 ald 545, at [41] that the
Ward presumption should be rejected on the grounds that
there is no basis in principle for importing a presumption
that lacks a solid empirical foundation. They contend that
the question of whether a state is unable or unwilling to provide protection is a simple question of fact that must, like all
questions of fact, be investigated in line with the shared duty
of fact-finding. In contrast, Audrey Macklin contends that,
properly interpreted, the presumption of state protection as
articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward does
not require refugee claimants fearing persecution by nonstate actors to rebut a presumption of state protection on a
balance of probabilities. Rather, the Federal Court of Appeal
has misconstrued and misapplied the Supreme Court’s dictum on the presumption of state protection.
We reproduce here a recent exchange between Hathaway
and Macklin on the significance and ramifications of the
notion of a presumption that states can and will protect
their citizens.

James Hathaway to Audrey Macklin, 28 June 2014

I’m intrigued by your point about whether a presumption
needs a factual basis or not. Let me push you a bit on this
one.
1. The presumption of state protection is actually a
factual presumption—and in this sense I think it is
quite different from the presumption of innocence,
which is really just a means of operationalizing the
criminal law’s burden of proof. If, as I think must
be the case, entitlement to refugee status ought to be
an open-ended inquiry into the merits of the factual
need for surrogate protection, it seems to me that the
bar for a “factual presumption” would have to be set
quite high—something that is usually, perhaps nearly
always, the case. If that is not so, I can see no reason
to encumber the refugee with the duty to dislodge the
presumption rather than simply asking the question.
2. This does not mean, by the way, that I’m not persuaded by Ward’s true presumption—in favour of a
well-founded fear of being persecuted if an absence of
state protection is shown. I think the empirical case
is definitely stronger for this than the “states can and
will protect” presumption, but not so overwhelmingly clear that the question shouldn’t just be asked.
So while we agree that the “double burden of proof”
is the most patent manifestation of the problem, it
seems to me to flow from the counterfactual factual
presumption.
Thoughts?

Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 25 June 2014

1. I disagree with you that the Supreme Court of Canada
in Ward made a critical mistake in talking about a presumption that states are able to protect their nationals,
which it derived as an implication flowing from state
sovereignty. Contra the Australian Full Federal Court
in A, not all presumptions require a basic fact. Most
notably, criminal law presumes sanity without any
underlying basic fact. The presumption of innocence is
another, albeit more complicated example. So even if it
is a presumption without a basic fact, that is not fatal.
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think appropriate. The presumption is not factual,
and so tells us nothing about how hard it will be to
dislodge it as an empirical matter in any given case.
And if the burden is relatively light (in comparison to
the criminal or civil standard), this is the product of
many factors. One might be the factual weakness of
the legal presumption, but I’m not sure about that—
I’d have to think about it more deeply.
5. Now, there is another way of coming at this, which
you hint at in talking about an “open-ended inquiry.”
One could imagine a system that did not allocate the
burden of proof. It would be a purely inquisitorial system in which the decision-maker was responsible for
investigating and determining refugee status. In such
a system, there would be no need for a legal presumption, because there is no burden to allocate as between
parties. But that is not the system we have—even
when interpreted generously to allow for the engaged,
inquisitorial decision-maker and a non-adversarial
process. I am not commenting on the desirability of
such a process, just on whether it exists at present.
But more significantly, it is not the system that the
Supreme Court thought we had when it decided Ward.
It operated on the understanding that one party did
bear the burden, and that party was the claimant. The
presumption of state protection, like the presumption
of innocence, is a device for allocating the burden at
the outset. It is not pulled out of thin air, but it should
not be misconstrued as a factual presumption that
applies to a specific element of the refugee test (existence of persecution).
6. So, if I thought the presumption was a factual one,
I think I would agree with you. But I don’t think it
is. And I think that when the Supreme Court talks
about clear and convincing evidence, etc., it is only
imposing an evidentiary burden on the claimant, as
in “If you are from a country where the state apparatus has not broken down (however defined) and you
don’t show clear and convincing evidence re: lack of
state protection, you are at risk of a negative inference
being drawn.” We could have done without it, in my
view, but I don’t think it is as damaging as the Federal
Court has made it through its own distortions.
So, if I’ve understood you correctly, our divergence stems
from a difference of opinion about whether the POSP is best
understood as a legal or a factual presumption. Does that
seem right?

Glad to be pushed on this. The way you framed your
response helps me see more clearly where and why we differ
in our route to the same outcome.
1. I think the presumption of state protection (POSP)
is, like the presumption of innocence (POI), a legal
and not a factual presumption. Perhaps the Federal
Court’s mistake can be rephrased as erroneously treating the presumption of state protection as if it were a
factual presumption. I assume that we agree that the
presumption of innocence is a legal (and not factual)
presumption—after all, about 2/3 of people who are
charged are convicted. So as factual presumptions
go, it doesn’t work. I also agree that the main point
of the POI is to allocate the burden of proof: it is the
state that must prove that the person committed the
offence, and not the individual who must prove her
innocence. There are various sound reasons for allocating the burden that way. And the burden is heavy
(beyond a reasonable doubt), but for reasons that have
little to do with the factual likelihood that the accused
committed the offence.
2. Similarly, I think the POSP is a legal presumption that
allocates the burden of proof to the claimant to establish the elements of the refugee claim. We express/justify it by saying something like this: The international
state system is predicated on the claim that states are
able and willing to protect their citizens. That is part
of the justification for the allocation of sovereignty
to individual states, etc. And that is also why refugee
protection is (as you put it) surrogate protection—
meant to address the anomalous situation where the
state doesn’t actually fulfil its obligations. If it wasn’t
a departure from the “norm” of state protection, we
wouldn’t call it surrogate. So we put the burden on the
one who challenges the norm to show that expected
protection will not be forthcoming in his case.
3. To the extent that POSP is a legal and not a factual presumption, it doesn’t tell us anything about how “heavy”
the burden on the claimant ought to be to make her
case. And, for a variety of good reasons, courts have
decided that the standard should be relatively light—
“reasonable chance” or “serious reasons,” rather than
balance of probabilities or beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. So we say that the states are presumed able/willing to
protect their citizens (because the international state
is predicated on it, legal fiction though it may be). That
means that the burden is on the claimant to make out
the elements of a refugee claim (well-founded fear of
persecution on an enumerated ground), according
to the standard of proof (reasonable chance) that we

James Hathaway to Audrey Macklin, 30 June 2014

1. I think your para. 2 is the nub of the issue. The presumption of innocence in criminal law serves a helpful
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described in paragraph 5 in my previous email: there
can be no legal burden of proof in a refugee claim. The
decision-maker is conducting an inquiry more than
an adjudication, and so the concept of burden of proof
is simply inapposite.
So I think this is where we come down so far:
1. We agree that the POSP purports to be a legal burden of
proof. I think it’s legally permissible (and inevitable in
practice, but that’s another story) to put a legal burden
on the claimant. You do not.
2. I think that the POSP puts the legal burden on a claimant to make out a well-founded fear of being persecuted on a standard of proof of reasonable chance
or serious possibility. You think that once the legal
burden is on the claimant, a higher standard of proof
necessarily follows, which cannot be reconciled with
“reasonable chance” or “serious possibility.” I think
that is mistaken, and this mistake gives rise to the
incoherent approach (not yours, the Federal Court’s)
of asking whether a claimant has shown on a balance
of probabilities that there is a reasonable chance of
persecution.
3. You think that if POSP cannot lawfully operate as a
legal presumption, it must be a factual presumption.
Factual presumptions are valid in principle, depending on the rationality of the inference from basic fact
to presumed fact. But POSP fails as a factual presumption. If I accepted that POSPis a factual presumption, I
would agree with you that it fails.
4. I also think that even if it was accepted as a factual
presumption, it could lawfully require no more of
a claimant than that she point to evidence that, if
accepted, could show that the level of state protection
still left a reasonable chance of persecution in her case.
That is how an evidentiary burden works and I think
this is what Ward says (on its best reading). Not sure
where you are on this point.
5. To add to your real world skepticism about what other
countries do/don’t do, it is perhaps noteworthy that
Maldonado, [1980] 2 FC 302 says that sworn evidence
is presumed true. So, if taken seriously, that would
go a long way to alleviating the concern that a legal
burden on a claimant is unduly onerous, since sworn
testimony is the main evidence in any case. Of course,
Maldonado is honoured in the breach, just as other
countries without a legal burden of proof on claimants
find ways to reject claims anyway.
I really think our disagreement is about whether it is permissible to put a legal burden of proof on a claimant, and
whether that necessarily dictates what I call the standard
of proof. You say no/yes and I say yes/no. I’m drawing on

function in reinforcing in a practical way the agreed
legal standard of proof—i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. As your analysis in para. 2 makes very clear, the POSP
invented by Canadian courts does exactly the opposite: it undermines the legal standard of proof—wellfounded fear, i.e., only a reasonable chance or serious
possibility—by requiring more of the claimant than
the Refugee Convention allows. Thus, when you say
(accurately) that “the POSP is a legal presumption
that allocates the burden of proof to the claimant to
establish the elements of the refugee claim,” you are
right—that’s exactly what it does, and at a high level.
But that is also precisely why it is untenable as a matter of international law, since there is a shared duty of
fact-finding that requires only that at the end of the
day the evidence adduced meets the well-founded fear
test. My guess is that this is why other countries don’t
go down this road (even if they invent equally awful
mechanisms to avoid their responsibilities).
3. So this brings me back to where I began: if this is being
treated as a “legal” presumption, it shouldn’t be—that
standard is well-founded fear. Hence it would only be
appropriate to have a POSP if it were a “factual” presumption—which it can’t be, for the reasons we agree
on.
Are we getting closer?

Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 30 June 2014

1. Almost there, I think. I think, however, that you conflate two separate questions: (a) who has the burden
of proof?; and (b) what is required to discharge that
burden?
2. The first is the legal burden of proof and it is allocated
to the state in criminal law, and the plaintiff in civil
cases. The second is the standard of proof and could,
in principle, be answered in different ways—beyond a
reasonable doubt, on a balance of probabilities, whatever. After all, we allocate the burden of proof to the
plaintiff in civil cases, but the standard is only balance
of probabilities; in criminal law, we allocate the burden to the state, and the standard is higher. But if the
state is suing someone in civil court for a tort action,
the standard is balance of probabilities. So, knowing
where the legal burden lies does not answer what the
standard of proof is. What we have in refugee law (on
the best reading of Ward) is a legal burden on the
claimant, on a standard of proof that is “reasonable
chance” or “serious possibility.”
3. I’m not sure if we are struggling with semantic murkiness, but my sense is that you want to endorse what I

52
© James C. Hathaway and Audrey Macklin, 2016. This open-access work is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International License, which permits use, reproduction and distribution in any medium for non-commercial purposes,
provided the original author(s) are credited and the original publication in Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees is cited.

Volume 32

Refuge

my understanding of how burdens work in criminal law
(although I’ve not taught it in a long time).
I should say that I quite enjoy trying to work out this
point, and I also suspect that we are the only people in the
world who would find it interesting.

Number 3

traditional evidentiary standards (criminal or civil) by the
decision to adopt the “well-founded fear” standard—sui
generis to refugee law. Is this at the root of our contrasting
points of view?

Audrey Macklin to James Hathaway, 30 June 2014

James Hathaway to Audrey Macklin, 30 June 2014

1. I think your point about the tendency to require more
than “reasonable chance” to discharge a legal “presumption” is interesting and I need to think about it
more. I’m not immediately persuaded that the label
“presumption” must require more than a reasonable
chance to qualify as a presumption, but you may be on
to something as a pragmatic prediction of how “presumption” gets used in practice. What follows from
that, I’m not sure, but either way it warrants more
thought.
2. My reliance on criminal law is only this: my terminology distinguishes burden of proof from standard
of proof, and legal burden from evidentiary burden,
in the same way that Canadian law (both criminal
and civil) does. And I operate from the proposition
accepted in Canadian law that the imposition of an
evidentiary burden doesn’t change the legal burden of
proof. I just want to be sure that when you and I use
these terms, we ascribe the same meaning to them. I
had the feeling we might be invoking the same terms
but giving them different meanings. I certainly agree
with you that the actual standard of proof in refugee
law is sui generis, or at least distinct from the civil/
criminal standards of proof. As you may know, the
legal burden of proof under the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for inadmissibility
is on the government, yet the standard of proof is
notably lower than balance of probabilities (“reasonable grounds to believe”)—and it only operates to the
disadvantage of non-citizens.

1. If by “legal burden of proof” you mean who has the
burden of production, then by and large—though subject to the shared duty of fact-finding!—I can agree
that this lies with the person seeking recognition of
status. But a legal burden of proof should not in my
view be given any greater substantive role than this,
since there is ultimately only one evidentiary question
in refugee status assessment and that is defined by the
“well-founded fear” standard—nothing more, nothing
less.
2. Assuming we’re now both speaking about the quantitative question (how much evidence is enough?),
then I think that a “presumption” of state protection
means that the applicant can in practice only succeed
by showing more than the well-founded fear standard
requires. For example, in Cardoza Fonseca, (1987) 480
US 421, the US Supreme Court rejected the view that
anything approaching balance of probabilities was
required. Yet how do you overcome a presumption
with only evidence of a 10% risk? Any reference to
having to show anything on a balance of probabilities,
much less to rebut a presumption, seems almost inevitably to drive us to something beyond that standard (a
concern that seems clearly borne out in the Canadian
Federal Court caselaw).
3. We agree that factual presumptions are valid in principle, depending on the rationality of the inference
from basic fact to presumed fact and that POSP fails
as a factual presumption. To me the Supreme Court’s
test is clearly an (unwarranted) factual presumption.
4. I agree that a reading of Ward along the lines of what
you posit would help to alleviate the problem—but
this does not seem remotely what the Federal Court
understands it to mean. And perhaps I have a bit more
sympathy for the unhappy approach of the lower
courts and tribunals because I think that the Supreme
Court of Canada unnecessarily complicated things by
referencing a presumption when simply leaving it as a
neutral question of fact would have been better.
I’m wondering if our difference comes from the fact that
you say that you’re approaching this from a criminal law
point of view, whereas I am not. I don’t really understand
why you would want to anchor your thinking in such a
different body of law, given the quite explicit rejection of

Note
1 James Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee
Status, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014).
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the University of Michigan. The author may be contacted at
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Audrey Macklin is professor of law and chair in Human
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